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Introduction
The New Zealand public management 
model is a product of 1980s and 1990s 
enthusiasm for replacing hierarchy and 
centralised bureaucracies with contracts 
and market-like methods for delivering 
public services. Fervour for change from 
tradition is illustrated by the titles of these 
books published in 1992, a high-water 
mark for public sector reform in New 
Zealand: Liberation Management (Peters, 
1992), Reinventing Government (Osborne 
and Gaebler, 1992) and Breaking through 
Bureaucracy (Barzelay, 1992). 
New Zealand central agencies – the Treasury, the State 
Services Commission and Department of  the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet – have at different stages since 1988 been 
active ‘reinventors’, ‘liberating’ other agencies from detailed 
financial and personnel controls, but at times also viewed by 
other public sector agencies as bastions of  bureaucracy. 
Central agencies internationally have responded in 
contrasting ways to public sector reform (Peters, 1998):
• central agencies are often the source of  reform, and drive 
reform efforts; and
• central agencies have a difficult time reforming 
themselves, and are generally the least reformed parts of  
government.
In New Zealand, the Treasury was the dominant reformer 
of  the 1980s, with the State Services Commission a reluctant 
starter, forced to join after the appointment in 1985 of  
reformer Rod Deane as its chairman. The only central agency 
to remain untouched has been the small coordinating policy 
group of  the Department of  the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
maintaining effectively a political ‘fire-fighting’ role. 
More than most jurisdictions, New Zealand has devolved 
responsibility for managing people and resources to chief  
executives of  line agencies and to Crown entity boards. In 
the process, central agency roles have changed from being 
hierarchy-based control functions in a unified bureaucracy 
to their being agencies which have needed to learn how to, in 
the words of  one senior manager, ‘cajole, encourage, nudge, 
inspire and bring along others’.ii
The State Services Commission, the former personnel 
‘control function’, once the employer of  60,000 public 
servants,iii has experienced a series of  identity crises as it 
has adapted to a much reduced role as the employer and 
performance manager of  public service chief  executives. 
More recently it has been given new roles in e-government, 
leadership development, and standards-setting for the wider 
state sector. The new roles have come to ‘involve sticking 
our necks out and saying which way will lead towards a 
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better world’, rather than taking the safer road of  ‘waiting to 
criticise people for having gone the wrong way.’iv 
The Treasury, which reinvented itself  by devolving 
responsibility for routine accounting through the financial 
management reforms of  the late 1980s and early 1990s, has 
faced different identity challenges since its ‘glory days’ as the 
driver of  reform. That period of  major influence and large 
budgets associated with asset sales was followed by the less 
exciting routines of  managing the new, devolved system of  
accounting and budgeting. Particularly since the election of  
the Labour-led government in 1999, the one-time reform 
leader has been kept in its place by a Cabinet dominated 
by leaders who were opposed to the recipe for change in 
the late 1980s. The scepticism of  the minister of  finance, 
Michael Cullen, showed initially with his unwillingness 
to have a Treasury adviser in his Beehive office, and more 
recently with his response to the Treasury’s 2005 post-
election briefing papers. Recommendations for tax cuts in 
the briefing were dismissed as being the usual ‘ideological 
burp’ from Treasury. 
A strong economy has also diminished the influence of  
the Treasury, creating concern among senior managers about 
complacency in the organisation. Instead of  the driver being 
financial crisis, as during the 1980s, the challenge is to pursue 
new opportunities. To quote one central agency manager: 
 
 This is a really exciting time for New Zealand, when as a 
country we’re really establishing a sense of  nationhood. 
It’s a time when there are huge opportunities as well as 
huge risks out there in an economic and financial sense. 
A really strong Treasury at the centre – strong in the sense 
of  the advice that it can 
give and the services it 
can deliver – can make a 
real difference. 
In the view of  a different 
manager, the ‘very benign 
economic and fiscal position’ 
has meant that ministers have 
not really required assurance 
about performance, and 
have found it quite easy to 
‘provide more money’ when 
symptoms of  performance 
issues developed. That 
situation has changed 
more recently as ministers 
have become increasingly 
sceptical about what the 
‘more money’ approach has 
achieved. 
The New Zealand 
central agency least affected 
by the late 1980s reforms 
has been the Department of  
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, which has the same sized 
policy unit as it had in the late 1980s. It has avoided following 
the path of  counterpart agencies in Britain and in Australia, 
where political pressure for prime ministers and premiers 
of  Australian states to be presidential in style has resulted in 
large, White House-style offices. Despite recommendations 
that longer-term strategic thinking be part of  its function, 
the department largely focuses on reacting to the political 
priorities of  the prime minister and using its power of  
position as a coordinator of  whole-of-government issues. 
Among the identity challenges that have emerged for 
central agencies during a period of  decentralisation, the 
most significant leadership issue is well captured by Sapolsky 
(1967), who observed that innovative organisations work 
best with central authority that is too weak to interfere 
with spontaneous creativity, yet strong enough to embrace 
and oversee the implementation of  creative ideas. In its 
reforming zeal to liberate and reinvent government systems, 
New Zealand may have succeeded with the first requirement 
but seriously weakened the ability of  its central agencies to 
deliver on the transfer and implementation of  good practices. 
Much of  the current debate about the role of  central agencies 
results from this tension.
Competing organisational values
The challenges facing central agencies are usefully interpreted 
through the lens of  the ‘competing values’ framework 
(Cameron and Quinn, 2006). The pre-1988 public service 
emphasised hierarchical structures and a clan-like focus on 
lifetime employment. Internal focus and integration, coupled 
with stability and control, were major features of  a public 
service model in place since 
1912. The State Sector Act 
1988, with its delegation of  
flexibility and discretion to 
chief  executives and opening 
up of  public service roles to 
external competition, was a 
radical move towards external 
focus and differentiation 
of  public sector tasks. The 
reformers’ goal was to shake 
up a service characterised 
as unresponsive and bureau- 
cratic, and improve perfor-
mance through clarity 
about roles and pressures 
from contract and market-
like mechanisms. In place 
of  bureaucratic and clan 
management would come 
results-focused market and 
network modes of  delivery, 
and an influx of  managerial 
skills from the private sector. 
(See figure 1.) 
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Figure 1: Competing values model
Source: Cameron and Quinn (2006). 
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Instead of  being control units at the centre of  a large 
bureaucracy, the renamed ‘central’ agencies would have 
new roles exercising steering and monitoring functions at the 
centre of  what Davis (1997, p.226) described as ‘a transparent 
universe of  subcontractors, organised around statements of  
goals and strategic plans, concerned not with some nebulous 
public good but with meeting performance indicators set out 
in an agency agreement’. 
The decentralised model adopted by New Zealand can be 
viewed as drawing on what was seen as 1980s best practice, 
embedding in legislation the most popular organisational form 
of  the era. The models of  the late 1980s were conglomerates, 
with small corporate offices using what Goold and Campbell 
(1987) described as a ‘financial control’ model to manage 
market-like relationships with diverse and often unconnected 
businesses. The business world was to learn through the 
subsequent performance of  some diversified conglomerates,v 
run at arms length using financial controls, that this was not 
necessarily a recipe for long-term success. 
The values of  contracts and networks were at their most 
dominant during the creation of  the outputs-based budgeting 
system during the early 1990s, illustrated by this technique 
used by Treasury officials to prompt departments to prepare 
meaningful output statements: 
 Imagine your department is not here any more. It’s 
gone. The government wants to buy those services in 
the private sector. What should they contract for? How 
would you write the contract? (Norman, 1997, p.9) 
A core message of  the competing values framework is 
that organisations can have too much of  a good thing if  
they seek to adopt ‘one best way’. Effective and sustainable 
management requires a balancing of  the competing values 
and seeking solutions that use the strengths of  each. Contract 
and market models for the health sector and market rents for 
public housing proved politically unpopular, and Labour-led 
governments since 1999 have favoured clan-style responses 
of  collaboration and the building of  public sector capability 
over market solutions of  competition and contracting to 
networks of  providers. 
The political rebalancing of  competing values has 
affected central agencies significantly since 1999. Initially, 
political concerns focused on fragmentation of  services and 
whether ethical standards were sufficiently consistent across 
the decentralised public sector. The ‘Review of  the Centre’ 
(SSC, 2002) was established to respond to these concerns. 
Three years later, the political concern was about whether 
central agencies were sufficiently clear and coherent in their 
messages, leading to the 2006 review of  the role of  central 
agencies in ‘promoting and assuring state sector performance’ 
(Treasury, 2006).
Comparisons with Australia
Observations in this article about the changing roles of  
the New Zealand central agencies are part of  a wider 
research project about the roles of  central agencies across 
Australia and New Zealand, a comparative study made 
possible through the creation of  one of  those new ‘clan-
like’ structures, the Australia and New Zealand School of  
Government (ANZSOG). 
In comparison with Australia, New Zealand has adopted 
a distinctly decentralised model of  government organisation, 
with a weak centre being a notable feature. Table 1 compares 
New Zealand, with 4.2 million people, with Victoria, a state 
with a population of  5.2 million. Victoria opted in the early 
1990s to have eight mega-ministries reporting to ministers, 
in contrast to nearly 40 departments/ministries in New 
Zealand. A distinctive difference between New Zealand and 
Australian jurisdictions is the relatively strong role of  the 
New Zealand State Services Commission as the employer 
of  public service chief  executives. Equivalent organisations 
in Australia had even stronger identity crises as personnel 
controls were delegated, and chief  executive appointments 
made by politicians working through departments of  prime 
minister or premier rather than personnel commissions. 
Table 1: Expenditure on central agencies in  
New Zealand and Victoria (NZ$)
New Zealandvi Victoriavii
Treasury $52.5 million $271 million 
Department of Prime 
Minister/Premier $15 million $620 million
State Services 
Commission (New 
Zealand), State Services 
Authority
$58 million (42% 
for e-government) $11 million 
Effects of financial constraint
A tracking of  the financial fortunes of  New Zealand central 
agencies over the past 20 years (see Table 2) shows most 
notably a relative reduction in the power of  the Treasury. 
Current or former Treasury officials who experience 
nostalgia for the agency’s reforming role in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s remember an era when the agency was well 
funded operationally, and also had significant funds for the 
sale of  state assets, which are not included in these operating 
figures. 
Treasury-driven decentralising of  accounting functions to 
line agencies, and advocacy of  contestable funds, effectively 
reduced the future role of  the organisation. The delegation of  
analysis roles to organisations such as the Ministry of  Health, 
the Tertiary Education Commission and the Foundation for 
Research, Science and Technology also reduced Treasury’s 
range of  coverage. Treasury officials might believe, as one 
suggested, that ‘there’s something in the water at Treasury’ 
which makes for more rigorous analysis than the other bodies 
might provide, but the trend has been away from scrutiny at 
the centre towards scrutiny at a sector level. While still one of  
the largest policy analysis organisations, the Treasury also has 
competition for advice. The Ministry of  Social Development 
has been built up by Labour-led governments to provide a 
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social policy counterweight to economic advice. The Ministry 
of  Economic Development was reshaped by a minister from 
a left-wing minority party in coalition with the Labour Party, 
a strong opponent of  the 1980s and 1990s economic policies. 
It has also developed as an alternative source of  advice about 
business and economic development.
The reducing influence and subsequent revival of  the 
State Services Commission is evident in declining real budgets 
during the 1990s, once transition issues associated with 
reform were dealt with. The striking change has been since 
1999, with the addition of  a major new role as the initiator 
of  e-government – networked services across government 
– accounting for 42% of  the commission’s total budget in 
2006-07. New commitment to clan-style management 
has resulted in major investment in staff  development, 
particularly a Leadership Development Centre providing 
action-learning programmes for potential chief  executives, 
and the Australia and New Zealand School of  Government, 
which was established in 2003 with the aim of  creating a 
smaller, southern hemisphere version of  the Kennedy School 
of  Government at Harvard University in the United States. 
The Department of  the Prime Minister and Cabinet, with 
its role of  managing Cabinet processes, plays a central agency 
role through its 12-person policy group. This organisation 
has lived out the observation of  Winston Churchill that ‘We 
shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape 
us’.viii The Beehive, which houses the Cabinet, has had the 
practical effect of  limiting the potential size of  an advisory 
group, with successive prime ministers and chief  executives 
opting for informal and readily accessible advice within the 
Beehive over creating a large and specialised advice base. 
While the department has taken on special projects, most 
notably the health changes of  the early 1990s, but also crime 
prevention and more recently housing affordability, it has 
retained its basic size and identity throughout the 20 years. 
Discussion of  the role of  the centre and financial 
trends of  the past 20 years needs to include reference to 
an agency which for more than 100 years was at the centre 
of  government and exerted strong bureaucratic control 
over government engineering and construction. Engineers 
were effectively exiled (largely on the basis of  advice from 
economists) from the centre of  government in 1986, when 
the Ministry of  Works and Development was converted into a 
state-owned enterprise, and later privatised. The dominance 
of  large-scale issues among the major current challenges for 
government and its central agency advisers suggests that this 
market solution might have removed core capability from 
the public sector. During a period when climate change, 
urban transport, the future of  Auckland, reinvestment in 
rail and electricity generation capacity are among the major 
government agenda items, a lack of  capacity for managing 
large projects is a major issue for New Zealand compared with 
jurisdictions such as Queensland or/and Hong Kong which 
have agencies that coordinate infrastructure development 
(Michael, 2008). (See table 2 below.) 
Leading from a weak centre 
 President Harry S. Truman predicted that when 
General Eisenhower took over from him as president, 
‘He’ll just sit behind this desk and say, “Do this and 
do that,” and you know what will happen? Nothing.’ 
(Neustadt, 1990, p.10)
A major role for central agencies is to ensure that ‘nothing’ 
is not the response of  the public sector system to political 
decision making. 
In their roles as information gatherers and advisers, 
central agency officials have powers similar to those of  ‘staff  
functions’ in large private organisations, of  advising the chief  
executive of  the organisation about possible courses of  action. 
The military origin of  ‘staff  roles’ was that of  the adviser on a 
hill overlooking the battle field, with a sufficiently wide range 
of  vision to advise a commander (like General Eisenhower) 
about deployment of  troops. As Bellman (1986) observes, 
staff  groups are rewarded for initiating change and making 
improvements, whereas operations groups are rewarded for 
stability that comes from finding a best way to work and 
sticking to it in the interests of  efficiency. Conflict is built into 
the organisation structure so that the military commander 
can choose which perspective is most appropriate at different 
times. In their interactions with line roles, staff  advisers 
will be seen at their best as judges, teachers, shopkeepers, 
bookkeepers, craftspeople and ministers. At their worst they 
will be seen as policemen, eggheads, operators, bureaucrats 
or gadflies. The potentially conflictual relationship is summed 
up in the old joke that one of  the greatest of  lies is: ‘I’m from 
head office and here to help you.’ 
Staff  roles are broad in scope but shallow in their depth, 
in contrast to those of  line specialists, who have roles that 
Table 2: Trends in central agency budgets using 2007 dollars 
1987-88
Estimated Actual 
(millions)
1990-91
Estimated Actual 
(millions)
1993-94
Estimated Actual 
(millions)
1999-2000
Estimated Actual 
(millions)
2006-07
Estimated Actual 
(millions)
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet $6,828 $14,163 $20,493 $14,909 $14,947
State Services Commission $26,405 $30,873 $24,141 $18,958 $58,073ix
Treasury $99,156 $97,583 $87,311 $61,798 $52,468
Note: major one-off expenditures have been deducted.
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are ‘narrow and deep’. Staff  roles are invariably less easily 
measurable than those of  line managers in charge of  client 
transactions and processing routines. Staff  roles operate with 
a longer time frame and are more generic, making it easier 
to move between organisations than it is for line staff  with 
technical specialties. 
The ‘wide and shallow’ brief  of  central agency advisers is 
well captured in this comment: 
 When we deal with any state sector agency on a specific 
issue, we know we’ll always be the person who knows least 
about that issue. We have to be the person in the room 
who is most interested in getting to the big picture in a way 
which engages with everyone. Effective central agency 
work requires combining analysis of  the big picture with 
engaging other people. It is not just about analysis or the 
‘schmoozing’ skills. We need a balance of  both.x
The frustration of  central agency managers about 
motivating serious change from line agencies was evident 
from interviews. Central agency managers were concerned 
to get more of  a sense of  urgency for change. 
One of  those value-for-money questions was about how 
the large group of  capital city policy advisers worked, seen as 
closer to a university model of  the creation of  new knowledge 
than that of  a professional services firm. 
 If  we want to get value for taxpayers’ money, rather 
than research to develop new knowledge, we should 
be a lot more rigorous. Project disciplines could bring 
about higher productivity and faster turnaround with 
no diminution of  depth. But by and large we are 
running policy shops on what I would call an artisan 
model – relying heavily on individual expertise and 
individual professionalism and craftsmanship.xi
The frustration of  not being ‘in charge’ but waiting 
for orders from the commander is evident in the following 
comment about the reluctance of  the current government to 
be actively engaged in strategic planning: 
 The Holy Grail for a public servant working in a 
central agency is to get ministers to say these are our 
priorities. Ministers are wary of  doing that because as 
soon as you have a target you can miss something and 
to set targets politicians have to have real confidence 
that the bureaucratic machine will actually deliver.
The difficulties of  implementation are well captured by 
the same manager in this analogy about what can happen to 
a ‘tsunami’ of  change developed at the centre:
 The middle managers take that aspirational goal and 
reinterpret it in terms of  the work programme they 
already have. They break it down and pigeon hole it 
and before you know it, it’s like a wave on the beach. 
It just disappears into the sand – it’s gone. 
This sense of  frustration was well captured in the title of  
a classic book about public administration: Implementation: how 
great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland (Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1973). 
A period of  crisis provides a staff  adviser with considerable 
power, as occurred during the financial and political crises 
of  the 1980s and early 1990s. In less turbulent times, the 
options for action are usefully described as ‘sticks, carrots and 
sermons’ (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and Vedung, 1998). The 
budget process managed by the Treasury is a potential stick 
(and carrot, or incentive), but the logistics and administrative 
routines of  the process effectively mean that budget decisions 
focus on a small number of  political priorities, not a considered 
weighing of  the performance of  different agencies. 
The State Services Commission holds a proven stick and 
carrot with its management of  performance contracts for 
chief  executives, and the Department of  the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet has the threat of  prime ministerial intervention. 
Officials almost always turn up to meetings called by the 
department, one senior manager noted. 
The major current strategy for influence by the central 
agencies, the state sector development goals (SSC, 2007), is 
perhaps closer in nature to a ‘sermon’. Developed initially 
by the State Services Commission, the goals were revisited 
in 2007, and a Treasury-focused value-for-money goal has 
been adopted as the focal point for central agency joint 
action. The goals seek commitment by public servants to 
‘a system of  world-class professional State Services serving 
the government of  the day and meeting the needs of  New 
Zealanders’. ‘Transformation’ will occur with services 
that deliver value for money, are networked, coordinated, 
accessible and trusted, and attract high performing staff  to 
an employer of  choice. 
Culture shifts envisaged in these goals show the unfinished 
work of  competing values, and the extent to which the move 
begun 20 years ago, away from a hierarchical and internally-
focused clan is still a work in progress. Perhaps the major 
challenge with the development goals and the transformation 
envisaged in Table 3 is to stop them from becoming yet 
another ‘Wellington “bumper sticker”’.xii
Table 3: Changing the focus
From To
Output-focused Results-driven
Command and control Influencing and partnering
Wellington-driven User-driven
Vertical management Governing through networks
Emphasising expertise Integrating expertise
Sharp boundaries Permeable boundaries
Arms-length relationships
Partner and co-producer 
relationships
Rules and regulation Alignment on results
Conclusion
William Shakespeare wrote, ‘uneasy lies the head that wears 
the crown’.xiii The closest advisers to the wearers of  the 
‘crown’ in any political system are central agencies. When 
the wearers of  the political crown are uneasy, as has been 
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happening in New Zealand during 2008 with opinion polls 
predicting political change, central agencies tend to gain 
new roles and influence. Central agencies come into their 
own when political leaders want or need change, just as 
staff  advisers to generals gain influence when it is clear that 
proposals from line organisations to redouble existing efforts 
provide no solution. 
In retrospect, the dominance of  central agencies in the 
period between 1984 and 1999 was unusual, a product of  
a generation change in New Zealand politics, with new 
leaders, mostly in their forties, wanting radical change from 
the hierarchy and clan solutions well entrenched in the public 
service of  the era. A pendulum swing towards market and 
network solutions in the 1980s and 1990s has more recently 
been modified by political opponents of  such methods. 
During a period of  political and economic stability since 
1999, the central agencies have been limited in the extent to 
which they could play a ‘change agent’ role. Central agency 
work has been more process-focused, more routine. To use a 
final military analogy, central agencies have been like soldiers 
in peacetime – the equivalent of  chimneys in summer,xiv 
capabilities which need to be kept in a state of  readiness. 
The shape of  the new central agency challenge is captured 
in the state sector development goals, devised by the State 
Services Commission and adopted as a central task for all 
three central agencies. These seek more critical assessment 
of  performance as viewed by citizens, greater coherence 
of  delivery, and renewed focus on value for money. The 
goals require a balance between clan, hierarchy, markets 
and networks. But will the devolved management model 
in New Zealand, a product of  1980s corporate philosophy, 
be sufficient? Or will cohesion require tighter coordination 
on issues such as technology use, pay rates for public sector 
employees, and human resource management practices 
which make it easier for government to allocate staff  to new 
priorities? Having shed the bureaucracy-based control roles 
20 years ago, central agencies and their political masters 
are likely to increasingly engage in debate about whether 
reform has left them too weak to be effective catalysts for 
performance improvement within a decentralised system. 
i This is an edited version of a paper presented at the ‘After the Reforms’ symposium 
in Wellington, 28-29 February 2008, hosted by the School of Government at Victoria 
University.The author wishes to acknowledge financial support for this research from the 
Canada-based Infrastructure, Government and Health division of KPMG International. A 
similar article will be published as part of a KPMG series on public sector performance
ii Comment of a central agency senior manager, from an interview conducted for this research 
project 
iii About a quarter of total public sector employees 
iv Comment of a central agency senior manager 
v For example, the collapse during the 1990s of Brierley Investments Ltd, a corporate raised 
of the 1960s which by the late 1980s had become one of the New Zealand’s largest 
companies, using a financial control model to hold together unrelated businesses
vi 2006-07 estimated actuals 
vii 2005-06 actuals 
viii A comment made in 1943 in support of rebuilding the bombed out House of Commons 
exactly as it had been, with too few seats for all members, making for a crowded debating 
chamber
ix Note this SSC budget includes $22.26 million for new responsibilities for introducing 
e-government infrastructure 
x Interview with a central agency senior manager
xi Interview with a central agency manager
xii Interview with a senior manager 
xiii Henry 1V, Part Two, Act III, Scene I
xiv William Cecil, Lord Burghley (1520–1598), adviser to Queen Elizabeth I
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